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KENTUCKY-ACCELERATION

OF CONTINGENT REMAINDERS UPON

THE WIDOW'S RENUNCIATION
The main object in the interpretation of a will is to ascertain and to give
effect to the testator's intention. However, even if the will itself is quite clear
in its terms, the ascertainment of this intention becomes difficult when the testator is survived by a widow who renounces her share under the will and elects
to take the dower share provided for her by statute. ' The difficulty arises for the
reason that the testator probably did not even consider the possibility of her
renunciation, moreover, the testator s plan for the distribution of his property
cannot be completely carried out where the interest that the widow takes as her
dower share is either greater, or of a longer duration, than that which she would
have received under the will. In order to dispose of the estate in the manner
most consonant with what the testator did expressly provide and to establish order
and certainty in this field of the law, certain principles or rules of construction
have become accepted which "represent judicially crystallized conclusions as to
what a conveyor [or testator] normally would have intended if he had actually
considered the possibility of the partial ineffectiveness of his expressed complete
plan."
The less discussed problem of the effect of the renunciation itself, rather
than the effect that the derogating claim of the wife may have upon the distribution of the balance of the estate, has received attention in a recent Kentucky case,
Farmers Bank & Capital Trust Co. v. Morgan.- It is the purpose of this note to
examine this decision after reviewing the cases leading up to it in 'tis jurisdiction.
Determining the effect of a widov s renunciation in cases where the will
creates future interests is basic-ally a question of deciding whether those future
interests accelerate so as to give the other devisees or legatees a right to immediate
possession. Solution of the acceleration problem is essentially a matter of interpretation and here also the judicial technique is to use and rely on rules of
construction. Wherever a wvidow s life interest, as provided in her deceased
husband's will, is to be succeeded by another interest and the widow renounces,
the question arises whether the testator intended the remainder to take effect
in possession only upon the death of the widow, or whether he intended the remainder to take effect in possession upon the happening of any event which
would terminate thp widow s prior interest. For example, if A leaves his entire
estate to his wife for life, remainder to B in fee, and the widow renounces, what
is to be done with the balance of the estate? Since the widow cannot take
because she has effectively renounced any interest except her dower portion,
three possibilities remain open. If it is held that there is an intestacy as to that
portion of the property which was renounced, the heirs of A will receive an
Ky. R. S. 392.020, 392.080 (1948).
Rs-sTATrEIENr. PROPERTY 930 (1936). Where the satisfaction of the derogating claim of the wife causes "substantial distortion among the other testamentary disposmtions, so much of the renounced interest as does not pass as part of such intestate share is sequestered for judicial distribution among the other testamentary
distributees." 2 id. sec. 234. The main rules of will construction are set forth in
ATKiNsON, WLLS sec. 266 (1937).
308 Ky. 748, 215 S.W 2d 842 (1948).
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estate for the life of the widow, the remainder to B.' If it is held that B is entitled to the property, but that his interest is to take effect in possession only
upon the death of the widow, the property will be sequestered for her life and
B's interest will not become possessory until her death.' However, if it is held
that the widow s renounciation terminated her life estate, just as her death would
have, B will be put into possession of the property iunediately.' If the latter
course is followed, it is said that B's remainder is accelerated. In short, if the
provisions of the will were that the estate was to go to the wife for life, "at her
death to B," the words "at her death" are interpreted as "at her death or other
termination of the life estate." Stated more formallyacceleration refers to a hastening of the owner of
the future interest toward a status of present possession or enjoyment
by reason of the failure of the preceding interest. The preceding
estate, frequently a life estate, has not terminated, as might normally
be expected, by the death of the life tenant or the happemng of
the event on which it was expressly limited. Sometlng else has
occured which the law says ends the present estate; but the testator
or grantor did not expressly provide for this situation."7
The Kentucky Court's theory of acceleration is explained in Trustees Church
Home v. Morris where the will provided that the whole of the net income of
the estate was to go to the widow for life. the estate itself to be distributed to
various legatees at her death. The court held that the remainders were accelerated
upon the widow s renunciation, saying, "The only reason we conceive for the
testator s postponement of the distribution until the death of his widow was that
she nught be provided for, and when the reason for postponement ceased, as it
did upon her renunciation, we cannot see why those who were the cief objects
of the testator s bounty should be delayed in the enjoyment of their legacy."' It
was also pointed out that although the legatees would receive less because of
the immediate distribution, they would also have the benefit of having the estate
distributed sooner.
In Farmers Bank & Capital Trust Co. v. Morgan," however, the theory is
stated in a slightly different manner: "Nothing in the will indicates le [the
testator] wvished his estate held up indefinitely, without benefit to anybody, for
the purpose of ascertaming who would be in existence when the widow actually
died."" To summarize the reasoning of these and similar cases, it may be said
that where the widow renounces, remainders will be accelerated where it is
impossible to ascertain the actual intention of the testator, both because this is
the intent normally to be inferred from this type of will and also because there
is a policy of the law favoring the early vesting and the early indefeasibility
of titles.
However, since acceleration is a rule of inferred intention, it will not be
v. Seabolt, 60 Ky. (3 Met.) 139 (1860).
'3 SiNEs. FUTURE INTERESTS see. 761 (1936): 2 RESTATEMENT. PROPERTY scc. 231
(1936).
'Trustees Church Home v. Morris, 99 Ky. 317, 36 S.V 2 (1896).
3 SiNiFs, FUTURE INTERESTS, sec. 751 (1936).
4Augustus

"99 Ky. 317, 36 S.W 2 (1896).
"Id. at 321, 36 S.W at 3.
308 Ky. 748, 215 SAV 2d 842 (1948).
n Id. at 750, 215 S.W 2d at 843.
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applied where there is an actual contrary intention expressed in the will.'" To
avoid confusion or apparent error, it should also be pointed out that remainders
will not be accelerated where the derogating claim of the wife under the dower
statute so changes the testator s attempted plan of disposition that in cannot be
substantially carried out.'" That problem is outside the scope of this note.
There seems to be little question that vested remainders will be accelerated,"
subject to the exceptions noted above, but the result is not quite so clear where
the remainder is contingent. In Augustus v. Seabolt, decided in 1 86 0,"i a situation analagous to renunciation is found, and the court took this occasion to make
the unequivocal statement that contingent remainders could not be accelerated.
In this case the testator had limited his'wifes estate in the following language:
"I give and bequeath the real estate and slaves herein
devised to my beloved wife during her natural life, after her death
to be equally divided among the lawfully begotten children of my
brothers
or such of them as may be living at the time of her
death, or the said slaves and real estate to be sold and the proceeds
to be equally divided among the children as aforesaid.""
However, the will further provided that if the wife remarried she was to
keep only a part of the farm, no provision being made for the disposition of the
other portion. Upon the widows remamage two of the testators brothers
claimed an interest in this undisposed portion as the hers-at-law, while the children claimed that their remainder interest had been accelerated by the widow's
remarriage and asked for an immediate distribution of tins portion of the estate.
The court in denying acceleration because the interest of the remaindermen was
contingent held that there was an intestacy as to this portion of the est itc and
that the heirs-at-law were entitled to it until the death of the widow, when
it would be distributed to the remaindermen. The court said:
"Estates are contingent which are limited to take effect
upon the happemng of an uncertain and doubtful event, or when the
persons to whom they are limited, are not ascertained or yet in
being.
Here the estate in remainder is limited to take effect upon
the happemng of a certain event-that is, the death of the widow;
but it is limited to such of the children, of the brothers designated,
as shall be living at her death. Whether any of such class will then
be alive, or if so, how many is7 of course uncertain, and cannot be
known until the event occurs."'
Although this case would seem to stand quite clearly for the proposition that
contingent remainders cannot be accelerated, its effect has been modified by
O'Rear v. Bogie," decided in 1914, where the will directed that the testator s
property should go to Ils wife for life, remainder to her brother for life, and
-'O'Rear .. Bogic. 157 KN. 666, 669, 163 S.W 1107, 1109 (1914).
Supra note 5.

"

"Baldwin s Coe\

is

%.Curr%, 272 KN. 827 15 S.W 2d 333 (1938): Ruih s Ex rs.

v. Ruh, 270 Kv. 792. 110 SW 2d 1097 (1937): Breckmnridge v. Breckinridge's Ex'rs.,
261 Kv. 82, 94 S.W 2d 283 (1936); Trustees Church Home v. Mornc 99 Ky. 317, 36
S.W 2 (1896).
1560 KN'. (3 Met.) 139 (1860).

WId. at 141.

171d. at 145.

" 157 Ky. 666, 163 S.W. 1107 (1914).
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upon the death of both to the then living descendants of testator's brothers and
sisters. Compare this language of the material portion of the will with that of
the preceding case:
"Upon the death of both my said brother and my wife,
or in the event they both should be dead at my death, I give, bequeath
and devise the remainder of my property herein given them and not
otherwise disposed of by this will, to my kindred as follows: To the
descendants that are then living of my brothers and sisters as if I
had died intestate.

) being now dead,
"All my brothers and sisters (save
the said property is directed to go to the children then living of my
said brothers and sisters, and to the then living descendants of such
of them as are dead."' (Italics writer s).
Her brother having predeceased her, the widow renounced and the court
held that the remainders were accelerated and that the descendants described in
the will living at the time of the renunciation took the property immediately. The
court said that in Augustus v. Seabolt there was an actual intention expressed in
the will that the property was not to be distributed until the death of the widow.
Reiterating the old maxim that the testator s intention is controlling, the court
was able to find an intention that the remainders should be accelerated in
O'Rear v. Bogie, and the question whether a contingent remainder could be
accelerated in the absence of any indication of intention was deliberately sidestepped. The court pointed out:
"While there are not a few cases holding that the renunciation of a will by the widow will not precipitate a contingent
remainder, they recognize the rule that this will not be so held where
to do so will defeat the testator's intention apparent on the whole
will, and we are of the opimon that this case falls within the
exception."''
While it would be possible to reconcile these two cases if merely the language of the opimons were taken into consideration, yet when the wills themselves are examined the distinguishing difference as to intention which the court
was able to say it had found in O'Rear v. Bogze is not quite so obvious. Since
the language in neither will was unusual, since both involved contingent remainders, and since neither will really shows any actual intention either to
accelerate or not to accelerate, the cases are probably contra. Taking this into
consideration, the conclusion to be derived from the later case would seem to be
that contingent remainders will be accelerated where no contrary intention is
found, the court supplying a type of inferred intention m such a case.
In two later
statements on the
tingent remainder
renunciation, and

cases vested remainders were accelerated' and rather general
subject were made but in another it would seem that a conwas accelerated. = However, the latter case did not involve
the issue of contingent remainders was not raised. In

D.Id. at 667, 163 S.W. at 1108.
'*Id. at 670, 163 S.W at 1109.
"Ruh's Ex'rs. v. Ruh, 270 Ky. 792, 110 S.W 2d 1097 (1937); Breckinridge
Breckinridge's Ex'rs., 264 Ky. 82, 94 S.V 2d 283 (1936).
' Brooks v. Stuart, 238 Ky. 235, 37 SAV. 2d 56 (1931)

.
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Baldwin s Coex rs. v. Curry (1938)' the facts squarely presented the question
and what were in fact contingent remainders in a trust fund were accelerated.
However, the authority of this case would not seem to be definitely controlling
since the general proposition that remainders accelerate upon renunciation was
conceded by counsel and the contingent nature of the interests was not discussed.
The latest case m point, mentioned at the beginning of ths note, is
Farmers Bank & Capital Trust Co. v. Morgan (1948)." The testator bequeathed
his property to the trustee for the use and benefit of his wife for life, then:
"At the death of my said wife the said trust, shall cease,
and the whole of my estate shall then go in fee simple in equal parts
to my two sons.
If at the time of the death of my said wife
either of my two sons shall be dead without leaving descendants,
the whole of my estate shall go to the surviving son; but if at such
time either of said sons shall be dead, leaving descendants, such
descendants shall take the share which would otherwise go to such
son if he were living, per stirpes and not per capita.' '" (Italics
writer s).
The widow renounced the will, and the two sons contended that their remainder interests were thereby accelerated and that they were entitled to the
estate immediately. The trustee and the infant daughter of one of the sons
maintained that the two sons had been bequeathed only contingent remainders,
and that the parties entitled to the estate could not be determined until the death
of the widow. It was held that the estate should immediately be distributed
to the two sons, the court characterizing their interests as "vested remainders
subject to defeasance."' This decision was rationalized in the following interesting language:
"The intention of the testator manifested in the will is,
of course, controlling. Two principle objectives are shown by this
instrument: (1) the testator's widow was to have the use and benefit
of this estate during her lifetime, and (2) when her interest had been
satisfied, the two sons were to receive the estate 'in fee simple.' A
third possibility was also in the mind of the estator: that is, if either
or both of the sons did not survive the widow, the survivor or descendants of a deceased son or sons, if any, were to take their shares.
"It is argued for the appellants that the testator, having
fixed a time for the termination of the trust, made the objects of ins
bounty those persons who would then be in existence. We do not
think the will may be construed as indicating the testator had any
such thought in mind. Clearly he was more interested in Ins sons
who he specifically named than he was in their possible descendants
about whom he might never know."
This rationalization is interesting for several reasons. First, it shows that
the court realized quite clearly that it was accelerating what is normally termed
a contingent interest. Second, from this case the proposition may be derived that
this type of remainder will be accelerated unless an actual contrary intention is
-1272 Ky. 827, 115 S.W 2d 333 (1938).
308 Ky. 748, 215 S.W. 2d 842 (1948).
Id. at 749, 215 S.WV 2d at 842.
" Ibid.
a

Ibid.
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found in the will. Finally, the use of the term "vested remainders subject to defeasance" shows an unwillingness to hold that a contingent remainder can be
accelerated.
While the court admitted that the characterization of the estate did not solve
the problem and decided the ease just as it would have if the issue of contingent
remainders had not been raised, yet it does not seem accurate to term the interest
of the remaindernen vested subject to defeasance, even though such terminology
has been used by the leading legal writers on this subject.'
According to accepted legal definition a vested interest is one which is "
deprived of the right
of immediate possession by the existence of another estate created by the same
instrument."
Also, it is elementary that the will is to be read and interpreted
as of the death of the testator."' If the will in Farmers Bank & Capital Trust Co. v.
Morgan is interpreted in the light of these two principles, it will be seen that
the interests of the remaindermen were actually contingent. At the time of the
death of the testator and before the renunciation of the widow, they were deprived of the right of possession by more than the life estate of the widow. The
possibility that their estate might become possessory was dependent upon their
survival of the preceding life estate. Since such survival was a condition precedent
to their enjoyment of the remainder, it is apparent that according to ordinary
legal terminology their remainders were contingent. However, since the question whether the remainder is contingent or vested subject to defeasance is one
of intention, to the extent that there is an intent to accelerate ascertainable from
the will the remainder is vested. Because the interpretation of testamentary
language is rarely free from doubt it is difficult to say absolutely in any particular case whether or not the remainder is contingent or vested subject to defeasance. Hence, it would seem unwise to call such terminology improper in
these cases were it not thit the results of these cases are so uniform-regardless
of terminology.
Upon analysis it seems that what really takes place is that those using tins
terminology treat what are in terms contingent remainders as if they were vested
subject to defeasance because of the policy of the law favoring the early vesting
and the early indefeasibility of titles and because of the belief that such is the
intention normally to be inferred from the testator s use of certain words. Then
by reasoning that the question of whether a remainder is vested is a matter of
intention and since an "intention" to treat the remainder as if it were vested has
been found, the conclusion is reached that the remainder was really "vested subject to defeasance." When reduced to its simplest form, the hidden and unproved assumption in this line of argument is that as vested remainders are
accelerated, all remainders which are accelerated must be vested. Obviously
this is a non sequitur.
In consequence there are now three types of remainders to consider in
solving renunciation problems-vested, contingent, and those "vested subject to
defeasance," the latter being disguised contingent remainders which the courts
will accelerate. Now it is true that once this special use of these terms is understood, no harm is done; but it would seem that since little is accomplished by
such use and since this use does not correspond to the ordinary and accepted
2
1

RE STATEMENT, PROPERTY sec. 231, comments h, i,
TIFFANY, RrAi. PROPERTY sec. 135 (2d ed. 1920).

sec. 233, comment b (1936).

KY. R. S. 394.330; McElroy v. Trigg, 296 Ky. 543, 177 S.W 2d 867 (1911).
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use of the same terms, and thereby causes confusion, it should be abandoned.
Multiplication of terminology should not be substituted for plain talk.
To bneflv recapitulate the results of the three cases in which the question
of acceleration of contingent remainders was both raised and discussed, Augustus
v. Seabolt held that contingent remainders could not be accelerated. It was
later said in another case, however, that there was an actual contrary intention
expressed in the will involved in the Seabolt case. In O'Rear v. Bogie it was
intimated that contingent remainders might be accelerated, but the court said
that it based its decision on an actual intention. In Farmers Bank & Capital
Trust Co. v. Morgan a contingent remainder was characterised as a vested remainder subject to defeasance and an intention to accelerate was found. In other
words, the question has yet to be answered squarely in plain terms.
Taking this body of opinion as a whole, however, the following would seem
to be a fair statement of the law in this jurisdiction. First, an actual expressed
intention, either to accelerate or not to accelerate, is controlling. Second, in the
absence of a contrary intention contingent remainders will be accelerated, either
by finding an inferred intention or by characteritzing the remainder as vested
subject to defeasance. Third, the use of words such as "at her death" or "then
living," by themselves, will not be held to indicate an intention not to accelerate.
In bnef, the rules governing the acceleration of contingent remainders are exactly the same as those applicable to the acceleration of vested remainders! The
intention upon which the decisions rest certainly is not an actual intention, but
the intention normally to be inferred from the use of certain words in a particular way. This comes close to making these principles substantive rules of
law, rather than rules of construction.
It is submitted that for the sake of clarity and order in this field of the law,
and in order to state the law as it has actually been applied, the court at its
earliest opportunity should state clearly that the rules governing the acceleration
of both contingent and vested remainders are the same.
F H.

DAUGHERTY

